

Wholesale funding dry-ups

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Wholesale funding:

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 - Repurchase agreements, interbank loans, certificates of deposit

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 - Repurchase agreements, interbank loans, certificates of deposit
- **Prevailing view: Wholesale funding is fragile**
 - Uninsured, short-term, unsecured
- **Penalized by new liquidity regulation (LCR, NSFR)**

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 - High- and low-quality banks indistinguishable by lenders
 - Adverse selection: high-quality banks withdraw as rates increase
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 - Debt derives value from being information-insensitive
 - When information-sensitive: uninformed lenders cut funding
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- **Test competing theories**
 - Ideal laboratory: European market for certificates of deposits (CDs)
 - Different policy implications: transparency vs. opacity

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- **R3: In times of stress, funds are reallocated towards high-quality banks**
 - Inconsistent with adverse selection
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- Initial maturity between 1 day and 1 year (median = 33 days)
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- 1,383,202 ISIN-level observations, with 838,703 individual ISINs
- All events: issuance, re-issuances, buybacks

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
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- All events: issuance, re-issuances, buybacks

■ More than 80% of all euro-denominated CDs

CD market versus other wholesale markets


CD vs. repo



CD vs. ECB




CD vs. interbank



- CD is a large segment of wholesale funding
 - Similar size as the repo market
 - Larger than ECB funding and unsecured interbank market
 - No previous study on the CD market

- **R1: No market-wide freeze in CD market**
 - ... even when CDS spreads increase



■ CD issuers

- 276 individual issuers
- 196 French, 80 from IT, DE, UK, NL, IE, etc.
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■ **Matching with balance sheet and market data**

- 263 issuers matched with balance sheet data (Bankscope)
- Short-term credit ratings (Fitch)
- Stock price and CDS spread data (Bloomberg)

The importance of bank-specific dry-ups

■ Definitions of funding dry-ups

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

The importance of bank-specific dry-ups

■ Definitions of funding dry-ups

- Full dry-up: Amount outstanding falls to zero
- Partial dry-up: Loses 50% or more in 50 days or less

■ 75 events, including 29 full dry-ups

■ One full and one partial dry-up



- Year with highest number of funding dry-ups is 2011



■ Banks facing a funding dry-up are weaker on observables

	One year before event	
	Diff. from mean	Diff. from median
ROA	-1.249***	-0.577***
Net income / Assets	-0.014***	-0.006***
Impaired loans / Equity	55.879***	52.790***
Equity / Assets	-0.036***	-0.033***
CDS spread	82.180	110.245**
Short-term credit rating	-0.424***	-0.474**

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
■ Base regression

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta ROA_{i,t} = & \beta_0 \mathbb{1}\{t-1 \leq \tau_{DryUp_i} < t\} + \beta_1 \text{Size}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \text{Controls}_{i,t-1} \\ & + \beta_3 \text{Controls}_{c,t-1} + FE_c + FE_t + \varepsilon_{i,t},\end{aligned}$$

- $\Delta ROA_{it} = ROA_{it} - ROA_{it-1}$
- Coefficient of interest: β_0

Dry-ups predict future bank characteristics

$$\Delta ROA_t = ROA_t - ROA_{t-1}$$



Dry-ups predict future bank characteristics

■ Facing a dry-up predicts a decrease in ROA

- Inconsistent with adverse selection being large

Dependent variable: $\Delta ROA = ROA_t - ROA_{t-1}$

	Baseline		Share CD	Crisis
DryUp	-0.341** (0.135)	-0.508*** (0.139)	-0.874*** (0.176)	-0.610*** (0.143)
Size _{t-1}		-0.018 (0.025)	-0.004 (0.025)	-0.017 (0.025)
ROA _{t-1}		-0.713*** (0.038)	-0.717*** (0.037)	-0.717*** (0.038)
Impaired / Loans _{t-1}		-0.025*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)
GDP growth		38.957*** (4.969)	37.561*** (4.955)	38.732*** (4.954)
DryUp * Share CD ∈ [4%, 9%]			0.372 (0.407)	
DryUp * Share CD ≥ 9%			0.351 (0.302)	
DryUp * Crisis				0.133 (0.192)
Adj. R ²	-0.001	0.407	0.415	0.411
N. Obs.	948	684	684	684

Dry-ups predict future market outcomes

- **Concern for tests of asymmetric information**

- Information of market agents \neq information of the econometrician

■ Concern for tests of asymmetric information

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■ Use market data \rightarrow Incorporate information in real time

- Dry-ups predict increases in CDS spreads
- Also predict negative excess stock return, but insignificant

Δ CDS spread

	6 months		1 year	
DryUp	36.443** (15.748)	49.033*** (17.577)	43.824* (25.510)	61.896** (28.891)
Size _{t-1}		-0.707 (0.901)		-1.680 (1.770)
ROA _{t-1}		-2.354 (1.552)		3.948 (2.756)
Impaired / Loans _{t-1}		-2.041** (0.787)		-2.410** (1.180)
GDP growth		-1214.823* (650.329)		-2187.64 (1437.262)
Adj. R ²	0.570	0.585	0.563	0.573
N. Obs.	2,099	956	1,937	956

- **Evidence consistent with presence of informed lenders**

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- However, reverse causality concern
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- **Three solutions**
 - Use changes in impaired loans as dependent variable → [\[See results\]](#)
 - Interact *DryUp* dummy with share of CD funding → [\[See results\]](#)
 - Banks do not downsize significantly → No fire sales [\[See results\]](#)

- Uninformed lenders value information-insensitive securities
 - In stress, long-term debt becomes information-sensitive first
 - Predicts maturity shortening before dry-ups

Dependent variable:
Weighted average maturity of new issues

	<i>Panel A: Partial and full dry-ups</i>	<i>Panel B: Full dry-ups only</i>
$\tau - 1$	-24.660*** (2.281)	-29.732*** (4.521)
$\tau - 2$	-17.278*** (3.939)	-30.198*** (6.004)
$\tau - 3$	-12.134*** (1.699)	-14.664*** (4.742)
$\tau - 4$	-7.628 (4.902)	-11.610 (7.368)
$\tau - 5$	-7.506* (3.750)	-3.930 (5.243)
$\tau - 6$	-0.689 (4.132)	15.504*** (3.858)
Adj. R^2	0.166	0.165
N. Obs.	11,420	11,420

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- **Issuance in excess of the market**

$$E_{i,t} = \left[\log(CD_{i,t}) - \log(CD_{i,t-1}) \right] - \left[\log(CD_{m,t}) - \log(CD_{m,t-1}) \right]$$

- CD_{it} : Outstanding amount by i in month t
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- **Probit specification**

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(I_{i,t} = 1 | X_t) = & \Phi(\beta_0 \Delta ROA_{i,t} + \beta_1 \text{Controls}_{i,t-1} \\ & + \beta_2 \text{Controls}_{c,t-1} + FE_c + FE_m) \end{aligned}$$

- $I_{it} = 1$ if E_{it} above median or 75th percentile

■ Banks increasing ROA increase relative CD funding

- ... Regardless of whether market is stressed

	Dependent variable: Prob. of CD issuance in excess of the market	
	Above median	Above 75th percentile
Δ ROA	0.024*** (0.005)	0.031** (0.014)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes
N. Obs.	10,979	10,979

■ Stress Index

$$Stress\ Index_t = \frac{\sum_i R_{i,t}}{CD_{m,t}},$$

- R_{it} : Euro amount of dry-up by i at t
- CD_{mt} : Aggregate CD market size at t
- Computed at monthly frequency → [\[See index\]](#)

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■ Interact ΔROA with quantiles of Stress Index

- If effect magnified → Accelerated reallocation
- If effect disappears → Adverse selection worsens

■ Reallocation magnified when market stress is high

- ... Increasing in quantiles of the Stress Index

	Dependent variable: Prob. of CD issuance in excess of the market			
	Above median		Above 75th percentile	
Δ ROA	0.024*** (0.005)	0.018** (0.009)	0.031** (0.014)	0.016*** (0.006)
Δ ROA * Stress Index in Quartile 2		-0.003 (0.016)		0.008 (0.006)
Δ ROA * Stress Index in Quartile 3		0.033*** (0.012)		0.039 (0.033)
Δ ROA * Stress Index in Quartile 4		0.048** (0.020)		0.030** (0.015)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N. Obs.	10,979	10,979	10,979	10,979

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Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N. Obs.	10,979	10,979	10,979	10,979

■ High-quality banks do not reduce but *increase* funding

- Inconsistent with adverse selection being first-order

- **No evidence that adverse selection is first-order on wholesale funding market**
 - No market freeze
 - Dry-ups predict low future performance → Some informed lenders
 - Dry-up occurs when debt turns information-sensitive
 - Reallocation not random → From low- to high-quality banks

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- **Low adverse selection can explain market resilience**
 - Disciplinary role of wholesale funding (“tough creditors”)
 - Challenges the premise of regulatory liquidity ratios
 - However, no account for externalities arising from dry-ups


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- **Lender of last resort most likely to benefit weakest banks**
 - Consistent with empirical evidence (Drechsel et al. JF 2015)
 - ... But in contrast with received theory


The absence of market freeze

- No system-wide drop in volume
 - ... Even when CDS spreads increase




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- No system-wide drop in average maturity




- Negative spread with the Euribor of same maturity



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■ Yields on CDs with initial maturity up to 7 days



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■ Facing a dry-up predicts an increase in impaired loans

Dependent variable: Δ Impaired loans / Loans

	Baseline		Share CD	Crisis
DryUp	0.582*** (0.139)	0.507*** (0.138)	0.640*** (0.177)	0.612*** (0.151)
Size _{t-1}		-0.038 (0.025)	-0.042* (0.025)	-0.040 (0.025)
ROA _{t-1}		-0.011 (0.038)	-0.010 (0.038)	-0.007 (0.038)
Impaired / Loans _{t-1}		-0.017* (0.009)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.017* (0.009)
GDP growth		-24.918*** (5.044)	-24.463*** (5.068)	-24.706*** (5.031)
DryUp * Share CD $\in [4\%, 9\%]$			-0.490 (0.385)	
DryUp * Share CD $\geq 9\%$			-0.233 (0.306)	
DryUp * Crisis				-0.052 (0.093)
Adj. R^2	0.100	0.140	0.140	0.145
N. Obs.	676	675	675	675

■ Effect not magnified for banks with large CD exposure

Dependent variable: $\Delta ROA = ROA_t - ROA_{t-1}$

	Baseline		Share CD	Crisis
DryUp	-0.341** (0.135)	-0.508*** (0.139)	-0.874*** (0.176)	-0.610*** (0.143)
Size _{t-1}		-0.018 (0.025)	-0.004 (0.025)	-0.017 (0.025)
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N. Obs.	948	684	684	684

■ Facing a dry-up does not predict a decrease in size

Dependent variable: Δ Size

	Baseline		Share CD	Crisis
DryUp	-0.039 (0.035)	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.019 (0.018)
Size _{t-1}		-0.005** (0.003)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)
ROA _{t-1}		0.008** (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)
Impaired / Loans _{t-1}		-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
GDP growth		0.028 (0.497)	0.054 (0.500)	0.014 (0.497)
DryUp * Share CD $\in [4\%, 9\%]$			-0.009 (0.041)	
DryUp * Share CD $\geq 9\%$			-0.017 (0.030)	
DryUp * Crisis				0.008 (0.007)
Adj. R^2	0.031	0.197	0.195	0.198
N. Obs.	950	685	685	685


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- Captures number and magnitude of dry-ups

- Both partial and full



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